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Abstract 
Safety and risk are essential components of process industries. The research objective of 
this thesis is to develop a method to measure and monitor safety in terms of real-time risk of a 
process system failure. The risk monitoring concept was developed using event trees and 
Bayesian networks. Process instrument data such as flowrate was used as a basis for the risk 
probability calculations. The risk monitoring methodology was developed and applied to the 
Williams Geismar reboiler rupture and fire in 2013. The risk level of the reboiler was examined 
based on the original design prior to failure and an updated design based on recommendations 
made by the CSB. The accident probability was decreased by 96% and risk level was reduced by 
76.9%. By plotting the risk of a process overtime, future projections of risk can be predicted and 
action can be taken to prevent accidents before they could occur. 
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1. Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Process Safety and Risk 
Safety and risk are essential components of process industries. Process safety can be 
defined the identification of process hazards of and the use of technology to prevent and 
eliminate the occurrence of accidents (Crowl & Louvar, 2011). In terms of process safety, risk is 
determined by quantifying the magnitude of loss and the likelihood of an incident. Loss can 
include human injury, environmental damage and economic loss due to damaged assets and 
reputation. Nearly all process industries involve the use of hazardous materials and have risks. 
Risk cannot be eliminated. However, risk can be minimized to an acceptable level. 
1.2. Research Objective  
The research objective of this thesis is to develop a method to measure and monitor the 
safety in terms of real-time risk of a process system failure. This objective will be achieved in 
two parts. The first part of the thesis will explore the development of the methodology and the 
second part will apply the methodology to a case study to demonstrate real world applications.  
The methodology has used Bayesian networks method. The Bayesian networks models 
are developed and analyzed using GeNie 2.2 Academic by Bayesfusion, LLC, to model Bayesian 
Networks. (https://download.bayesfusion.com/files.html?category=Academia) 
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1.3. Thesis Outline 
The thesis structure is as follows:  
Chapter Two presents a literature review based on safety and risk in process industries. 
Process safety monitoring and accident modelling techniques are described. Six major accidents 
within the past 10 years are also discussed here. 
Chapter Three presents the methodology for predicting the incident of an overflowing 
tank and the subsequent risk associated with various physical factors. The simple tank is 
redesigned six times to show how increasing safety measures reduced the likelihood of an 
incident and the overall risk. Chapter Four presents a real world case study where the 
methodology of chapter three is applied. The case studied is the shell and tube heat exchanger 
rupture and fire in the Williams Geismar Olefins Plant on June 13
th
 of 2013 (CSB, Williams 
Geismar Olefins Plant Reboiler Rupture and Fire Geismar, Louisiana, 2016). The risk of 
overpressure of a reboiler associated with olefins or alkenes is discussed. The risk of the heat 
exchanger operation is assessed real time. Chapter Five summarizes and concludes the impact of 
the presented work. The potential of future studies based on this work are also discussed.  
1.4. Novelty of the Work 
The developed methodology presented here is unique and also the application of the 
methodology. This is a novel attempt to measure safety real time using risk factors. This thesis 
has presented concept in simple and easy to follow way. The case studies are also presented in 
simplified form so that readers can follow through the steps and understand the strength of the 
approach. This work put forward a new way to assess and monitor safety of process operations. 
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2. Chapter 2: Literature Review Monitoring Process Safety and Risk 
In process industries, accident modelling is used to answer these two important questions: 
why does an accident happen and how does an accident happen (Al-shanini, Ahmad, & Khan, 
Accident modelling and analysis in process industries, 2014). Risk assessments are part of 
accident modelling and are vital to the safe design, development and operation of a process. Risk 
assessments are used to determine how safe a process is and what appropriate safety measures 
should be installed to minimize any risks. Risk assessments are also used to determine which 
safety measures are the most economically feasible (Crowl & Louvar, 2011). According to a 
review completed by Chakraborty et al. there is currently no universally accepted system to 
detect early signs of safety deterioration and increase in risk (Chakraborty, 2003).  This thesis 
presents a method to measure risk of a process system in real time. 
Although there are many safety measures and models developed to make a process safer 
accidents can still occur. The term accident is used to describe an event that happens 
unexpectedly and unintentionally. Though the term accident implies that an accident is 
unexpected many have warning signs that indicate an accident will occur before it happens. 
Many accident reports indicate that there was safety performance of a process was degrading or 
non-existent prior to the event (Al-shanini, Ahmad, & Khan, Accident modelling and analysis in 
process industries, 2014). Table 2-1 describes six process accidents that have occurred in the past 
10 years. In the case of the Tesoro Martinez Sulfuric Acid Spill, the same consequence was 
experienced by two separate accidents within one month of each other.   
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Table 2-1: List of Process Industry Accidents 
Date Accident name Location Type Reason Impact 
Safety 
Factor 
Reference 
April 20, 
2010 
Macondo Well 
Blowout 
Northern Gulf 
of Mexico 
Fire, 
Explosion 
and Oil spill 
Loss of well control to release 
of Hydrocarbons to the 
platform, hydrocarbons ignited 
resulting in fire and explosions 
that sunk the platform and 
damaged well bore released oil  
11 killed, 63 
injured, severe 
environmental 
damage 
Mechanical;  
Operational 
(CSB, Investigation 
Report: Drilling Rig 
Explosion and Fire at the 
Macondo Well, 2016) 
December 
9, 2010 
AL solutions Metal 
Dust Explosion and 
Fire 
New 
Cumberland, 
West Virginia, 
USA 
Fire and 
Explosion 
titanium and zirconium 
particulates ignited in the 
blender that was processing 
zirconium 
3 killed, 1 
injured 
Mechanical  
 
(CSB, Metal Dust 
Explosion and Fire , 2014) 
June 13, 
2013 
Williams Geismar 
Olefins Plant 
Geismar, 
Louisiana, 
USA 
Fire and 
Explosion 
Overpressure of reboiler 
containing propane 
2 killed, 173 
injured 
Mechanical; 
Operational; 
Personnel 
 
(CSB, Williams Geismar 
Olefins Plant Reboiler 
Rupture and Fire Geismar, 
Louisiana, 2016) 
February 
12, 2014 
and March 
10, 2014 
Tesoro Martinez 
Sulfuric Acid Spill 
Martinez, 
California, 
USA 
Acid 
Release 
Valve failed spraying acid at 
two operators; 
Two operators sprayed when 
removing some piping 
2 seriously 
injured;  
2 seriously 
injured 
Mechanical;  
Operational 
(CSB, Tesoro Martinez 
Refinery: Process Safety 
Culture Case Study , 2016) 
October 
21, 2016 
MGPI Processing 
Inc. Chemical 
Reaction and Release 
Atchison, 
Kansas, 
USA 
Toxic 
Release  
During sulfuric acid delivery, 
operator connected the 
discharge hose to the fill line of 
the sodium hypochlorite tank. 
The chemicals mixed and 
formed a toxic cloud of chlorine 
gas, which was released to the 
surrounding areas 
140 sought 
medical 
attention, 6 
seriously 
injured  
Operational; 
Personnel 
(CSB, Key Lessons for 
Preventing Inadvertent 
Mixing During Chemical 
Unloading Operations, 
2018) 
August 31, 
2017 
Organic Peroxide 
Decomposition, 
Release, and Fire at 
Arkema  
Crosby, 
Texas, 
USA 
Toxic 
Release and 
Fire 
During a hurricane the Arkema 
plant flooded and lost power to 
the refrigeration trucks 
20 sought 
medical 
attention 
Environmental  (CSB, Organic Peroxide 
Decomposition, Release, 
and Fire at Arkema Crosby 
Following Hurricane 
Harvey Flooding, 2018) 
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According to Al-shanini et al. there are three elements of process safety: operational 
integrity, mechanical integrity and personnel integrity (Al-shanini, Ahmad, & Khan, Accident 
modelling and analysis in process industries, 2014). These elements are represented in Figure 2-
1, where the operational integrity is dependent on the mechanical integrity and both are 
dependent on the personnel integrity.  
 
Figure 2-1: The Three Elements of Process Safety 
The operational integrity of a process includes the initial design, design modifications, 
operating procedures and emergency preparedness plans. The mechanical integrity of the process 
includes material containment, maintenance and inspection and instrumental controls. The 
personnel integrity of the process includes the human aspects such as skill, work permits, 
training and communication.  
It could be argued that a fourth element of process safety could be added to. 
Environmental factors would have an impact on the other three elements of process safety. For 
example, the last accident listed in Table 2-1 was caused by environmental factors. The toxic 
release and fire at the Arkema plant in Crosby Texas was a direct result of flooding caused by 
Hurricane Harvey in 2017 (CSB, Organic Peroxide Decomposition, Release, and Fire at Arkema 
Personnel 
Mechanical  
Operational 
Process 
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Crosby Following Hurricane Harvey Flooding, 2018). The Arkema plant produced organic 
peroxides which must be refrigerated to prevent decomposition and self-ignition. The plant 
flooded during the hurricane and lost power to the refrigerated storage tanks. The peroxides were 
moved to refrigerated trucks which were also at risk of losing power. To prevent a larger 
accident, the trucks were burned in a controlled environment. It was concluded that Arkema did 
not account for that level of flooding during the plants design. It was recommended by the 
Chemical Safety Board (CSB) that the company design should consider that level of flooding in 
future designs for the plant. The environment is essential to protect but also has a negative effect 
on processes as shown in the Arkema accident example.  
When assessing environmental factors, both extreme and common weather types should 
be considered. Emergency response plans should be created with weather conditions in mind 
(IADC, 2015). It is known that weather and wind patterns influence design, especially when 
there are gaseous emissions (Crowl & Louvar, 2011). Figure 2-2 shows an updated model to 
include the impact of environmental factors on operational, mechanical and personnel integrity.  
 
Figure 2-2: Updated Process Safety Model to include Environmental Factors
Environmental 
Personnel 
Mechanical  
Operational 
Process 
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2.1. Measuring Safety and Risk 
The safety and risk of a process system are commonly measured using factors such as 
OSHA accident and fatality rates, loss time injuries and fatal accident rates of similar industries 
(Khan, Abunada, John, & Benmosbah, 2009). All of these factors account for the after effects of 
incidents and accidents once they occur. Process safety and risk can be measured using leading 
and lagging indicators.  
Lagging indicators are a measure of process outputs.  These indicators keep track of 
previous incidents and accidents to predict the frequency and consequences of future accidents. 
Lagging indicators signify how well a process is functioning based on how goals are being met 
and how well it is preventing accidents. Lagging indicators are reactive as modifications in 
operations and goals are made after outputs change (Khan, Abunada, John, & Benmosbah, 
2009).  
Where lagging indicators measure outputs, leading indicators are a measure of process 
inputs. Leading indicators are proactive where changes to process are anticipated and 
modifications are implemented before changes to a process occur. Leading indicators can 
include: how often risk assessments are completed, how many are completed or how often 
maintenance is performed.   
Both of these indicators should be used in process industries to monitor safety and risk 
and prevent accidents (Khan, Abunada, John, & Benmosbah, 2009). If accidents can be 
anticipated and understood before they occur they can be prevented (Al-shanini, Ahmad, & 
Khan, Accident modelling and analysis in process industries, 2014). According to the study by 
Charkaborty et al. industry leaders should identify and monitor lead indicators to signal potential 
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for process safety performance degradation (Chakraborty, 2003). By monitoring lead indicators, 
the management of process systems can be improved upon.  
2.2. Risk Assessments  
Shahri et al. stated that safety researchers agree that the greatest challenge of examining 
risk is that no prediction is completely accurate (Shahri, MahdaviNejad, & AmirKabir, 2016). 
Predicting the exact behaviour and likelihood of a particular consequence cannot be definitively 
determined. There are multiple tools and techniques available to assess risk, however, no single 
method is sufficient and a combination of methods are required. Since every operation is unique 
there is no “one size fits all” technique to complete the risk assessment. 
To complete risk assessments, accident modelling is used to create scenarios and examine 
the frequency and consequences associated with process hazards. The two most important 
questions of accident modelling are: why does an accident happen and how does an accident 
happen.  According to the literature review by Al-shanini et al. there are many different types of 
accident models across. The traditional sequential model types are: the Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Bowtie model and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(FMEA) (Al-shanini, Ahmad, & Khan, Accident modelling and analysis in process industries, 
2014).  
The fault tree analysis is a bottom-up graphical technique that is used to deduce and 
quantify the failure probability of a process system. The event tree analysis is a top-down 
graphical technique that is inductive and applies logic to determine the consequences of a 
process system. The event tree is used in the early methodology of the thesis and is described in 
detail in chapter three. The bowtie model combines the fault tree and event tree for a single 
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accident or initiating event. The failure mode and effect analysis is a step wise analysis that 
examines all potential faults of a process system and aims to prevent them.  
While the traditional models are useful for initial risk assessments they also have some 
disadvantages. Each of the traditional models are static and cannot be used to represent non-
linear or independent relationships of failures within process systems.  
A more modern approach to these models are considered dynamic sequential accident 
models (DSAM) which includes Process Hazard Prevention Accident Models (PHPAM) and 
Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA) (Al-shanini, Ahmad, & Khan, Accident modelling and 
analysis in process industries, 2014). There are currently two models proposed that would be 
considered process hazard prevention models. The offshore oil and gas model proposed by 
Kujath et al. (Kujath, Amyotte, & Khan, 2010) and the System Hazard Identification prevention 
and prediction (SHIPP) model proposed by Samith et al. (Samith, Khan, & Amyotte, 2011).  
The offshore oil and gas model begins with examining accidents and potential loss in the 
offshore field and identifies potential failures from a managerial and occupational perspective. 
This method emphasises the responsibility of the organization to prevent accidents rather than 
place blame on an individual. This method examines the barriers from a managerial point of 
view: release prevention, ignition prevention, escalation prevention, harm prevention and loss 
prevention. This model was successfully applied to the Piper Alpha and BP Texas City refinery 
accidents (Al-shanini, Ahmad, & Khan, Accident modelling and analysis in process industries, 
2014). A limitation of this model was that it does not examine the effects of some initialing 
events for accidents such as fire or explosion propagation. The offshore oil and gas model was 
used a basis for the SHIPP model.  
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The SHIPP accident model aims to reduce accidents by evaluating hazards and predict 
and prevent them by using additional barriers based on the offshore model. The barriers 
examined in the SHIPP method are: release prevention, dispersion prevention, ignition 
prevention, escalation and emergency management. The barriers are not always physical. These 
barriers can include operating procedures and emergency response plans. This method also 
determines ways to continuously monitoring the system. This model can be used with Bayesian 
analysis to estimate the likelihood of an accident based on previous data. The SHIPP model is 
both qualitative and quantitative.  
Both the offshore and SHIPP models shared a limitation. This limitation was that some 
barriers may be illogical and unnecessary. For example the examination of ignition barriers is 
inappropriate for plants where the materials are toxic or non-flammable.  
The last accident model to be discussed in this literature review is the dynamic risk 
assessment also known as the dynamic quantitative risk assessment. The dynamic risk 
assessment uses the same methodology of the quantitative risk assessment.  
11 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Risk Assessment Procedure 
Quantitative risk assessments are typically completed in four steps: hazard identification, 
frequency analysis and consequence analysis, and risk analysis. The step of scenario 
development is optional (Crowl & Louvar, 2011). The risk assessment process is shown in 
Figure 2-3. The hazards or dangers of a process are identified in each step of the process. Process 
hazards are determined during a Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP). This approach is 
structured and effective. Process drawings are used as a basis where each component of a system 
is examined and all possible deviations are determined. The hazards are applied to accident 
scenarios. In this thesis, the methodology of risk monitoring is applied to a single scenario. The 
frequency of occurrence and the consequence of the accident are combined to estimate risk. The 
estimated risk is analyzed whether it is acceptable or manageable the design or operation is 
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approved. If the risk is determined to be unacceptable, the risk must be revaluated and 
redesigned and the process is started over until the risk is acceptable.  
However, the dynamic risk assessment allows for the failure probabilities of the original 
risk assessment to be updated as new information become available or conditions change. In 
industry, quantitative risk assessments are typically completed every five years (Khan, Abunada, 
John, & Benmosbah, 2009). However, by using the dynamic risk assessment approach, the 
procedure changes and process degradation can be captured. This allows for a higher accuracy 
and continuous monitoring of risk conditions. The quantitative risk assessment uses event trees 
to determine consequence. However, Bayesian networks have become increasingly popular as 
the interdependence of accident causes are more easily mapped. 
The Bayesian Network is an approach can account for the possibility that multiple events 
may occur simultaneously to produce an accident. The Bayesian Network approach has been 
used successfully to estimate the likelihood of the occurrence of a release of LNG and the 
subsequent consequences. (Abbassi, Garaniya, & Khan, 2016). The Bayesian network approach 
was also successfully applied to the Willams Geismar reboiler accident (Guo, Khan, & Imtiaz, 
2019). The Bayesian network approach was used in the development of the methodology in 
chapter three and the case application in chapter four.  
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3. Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1. Overview 
In this section of the thesis, the methodology of the Bayesian Network development and 
risk monitoring system are outlined. An accident scenario, an overflowing tank, was created as a 
foundation for the methodology. First the accident probability was determined with an event tree. 
The same accident scenario was used for the created of the Bayesian network. A Bayesian 
network is developed to assess risk. The tanks safety systems were updated with additional 
safety features until the risk level was brought down to an acceptable level. This risk level is 
combined with simulated data to show the risk of the process system as a function time.  
3.2. Event Tree Analysis 
The event tree is an inductive analysis method used commonly in risk assessments. This 
analysis method is extremely effective at determining the pathways to an accident and the 
probability of the accident occurring. All event trees will begin with an initiating event where 
final results such as failure, near miss or safe operation are determined by intermediate events. 
The intermediate events are conditions and safety features of the system. Each event can only 
have two outcomes such as true or false, success or failure and yes or no. If available, failure 
data and statistics are used to determine the probability of the final event. The disadvantages of 
an event trees are their static and linear nature. Event trees rely on accurate data and the events 
failing in a sequential order (You & Tonon, 2012). The risk associated with this accident could 
not be developed in an event tree as the inputs and outputs are not binary.  
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3.3. Bayesian Networks 
It is argued in the literature (Marsh & Bearfield, 2008) and (Unnikrishnan, Shrihari, & 
Siddiqui, 2014) that combining event trees and Bayesian networks allows a more flexible model 
while maintaining the safety specific logic. To relax the assumption that the accident progression 
and event failures are linear, the accident scenario was modelled into a Bayesian network. 
Bayesian networks are dynamic in nature and allow for probabilities to be updated easily when 
new information is discovered. A Bayesian network is a probabilistic graphical modelling 
technique. Bayesian networks are both qualitative and quantitative which is making them 
increasingly popular for accident analysis. These networks are a combination of directed acyclic 
graphs (DAG), which are qualitative, and their conditional probabilities which are quantitative 
(Ibe, 2011). The BN is an effective way of representing interdependence between variables. 
According to (Darwiche, 2009), there are three steps to developing a Bayesian Network. 
The first step is to define the relevant variables, next the network relationships must be defined 
and finally the conditional probabilities are assigned to the variables.  
3.3.1. Defining Variables 
To predict an accident and the subsequent risk all relevant factors are considered as 
variables.  The characteristics of a variable are represented in nodes. Each characteristic have at 
least two states or more such as true and false. However, as the number of nodes increases so 
does the complexity of the network. A network can be made more manageable by reducing the 
number of nodes. The number of nodes can be reduced by combing the similar characteristics for 
the variable in a single node. If the states of the characteristics are the same and are considered 
mutually exclusive then they may be combined in a single node.  
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Consider the variable weather as an example. Weather, in this example, can be broken down into 
four characteristics: clear, windy, rainy and stormy. For the weather characteristics there are two 
states: true and false. Rather than have four nodes with two states, weather may be represented as 
a single node with four states.  
3.3.2. Network Relationships 
Once the variables are defined in nodes, the nodes are then categorized and relationships 
are mapped. Determining the relationships between nodes is also known as defining edges 
(Darwiche, 2009). There are three nodes categories: evidence, intermediate and query here are 
also three node mapping relationships: parent, child and leaf. (Darwiche, 2009). Evidence nodes 
are the input variables and are the first nodes. Evidence nodes must also be independent from 
each other. Since evidence nodes are first they are also parent nodes. Query nodes are the final 
outcomes and can be either child or leaf nodes. Child and leaf nodes are connected to a parent 
node. Intermediate nodes connect the evidence and query nodes. Only child nodes can be 
intermediate. However, a child node can also be connected to another child node. Leaf nodes do 
not have any child nodes after them.  
In terms of accident and risk analyses, only intermediate and evidence nodes can be set 
and query nodes are computational and cannot be changed.  
3.3.3. Conditional Probabilities 
Once the network relationships have been determined, the conditional probabilities are assigned. 
This is quantitative as the uncertainties are defined. The values of the conditional probabilities 
can be either objective or subjective. Objective values are ones determined from data, statistics 
and calculations. Subjective values are ones determined through an expert’s reason, beliefs and 
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experience. The conditional probabilities for this thesis are subjective (Darwiche, 2009). These 
probabilities are for predictive and demonstrational purposes. The conditional probabilities can 
be updated over time as new information becomes available. Updating the probabilities 
presented in this thesis is an area for future work. 
3.4. Methodology 
3.4.1. Event Tree Development 
To begin development of this proposed safety and risk monitoring system, a simple open 
tank was examined. The most severe and likely hazard of an open tank is tank overflow. The 
basis for calculation and risk plotting is the flow entering the tank. The tank examined as shown 
in Figure 3-1 has two manual valves. The first valve (V-1) is on the line flowing into the tank 
and the second valve (V-2) is on the line flowing out of the tank. The probabilities displayed in 
the following event trees are hypothetical and were not collected from any database and are for 
demonstration purposes only.  
 
Figure 3-1: Simple Open Tank with Two Manual Valves 
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After the tank set up was established, an event tree as shown in Figure 3-2 was used to 
quantify the probability of an accident. The first event was the condition of the flow, if there was 
no high flow or limited flow then the tank will not overflow. If the flow was high there was an 
opportunity for the tank to overflow.  
The second event was if the operator of the manual valves noticed that the flow was high. 
For this event, either the operator notices the high flow and reduces it or the operator does not 
notice the high flow and the condition continues.  
The third event would be the operator opening valve V-2 to increase the flow leaving the 
tank to prevent an overflow or not open the valve allowing for the overflow to occur. If V-2 is 
not opened, the next event would be for the operator to close V-1 to reduce the flow to the tank 
and prevent an overflow from occurring. If the operator does not close V-1 then an overflow will 
occur.  
The “X” at the beginning of the event tree represents the flow data before the first valve. 
The high flow condition would be picked up by a sensor before the process for a specified 
threshold. The occurrences of high flow conditions over a time frame, say one day of operation, 
out of how ever many data points are collected in the time frame would be multiplied by the 
probability of an accident occurring to display the safety of the process system any given day.  
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Figure 3-2: Event Tree of Overflowing Tank with Two Manual Valves 
As discussed before, the probabilities for the events are calculated by multiplying the 
values of the branches of the event tree. A sample calculation can be found below in Figure 3-3. 
Figure 3-4 shows all of the branches with the final probabilities calculated.  
 
Figure 3-3: Sample Calculation for Top Branch of Event Tree 
High Flow
Operator 
Notices High 
Operator 
Opens Valve 
Operator 
Closes Valve 
Result
Yes 0.85 Safe 
Yes 0.95 Yes 0.55 Safe
No 0.15
Yes 0.50 No 0.45 Accident 
No 0.05 Accident 
X
No 0.50 Safe
Manual Operation
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Figure 3-4: Event Tree of Overflowing Tank with Calculated Probabilities 
The final calculated values for the branches with the same outcome can be added for a 
final probability. Therefore the probability of an overflow accident is 0.0571 or 5.71% and the 
probability of safe operation is 94.29% for this tank example.  
By improving the safety features of the tank the probability of an accident can be 
reduced. Using the same tank with a bypass pipeline added to the flow line entering the tank as 
shown in Figure 3-5. If both V-2 and V-1 were unavailable then the operator could open the 
bypass valve V-3 and reduce the flow entering the tank.  
High Flow
Operator 
Notices High 
Flow and 
Reduces the 
Flow
Operator 
Opens Valve 
V-2
Operator 
Closes Valve 
V-1
Result
Yes 0.85
P(Safe) 
0.4038X
Yes 0.95 Yes 0.55
P(Safe) 
0.0392X
No 0.15
Yes 0.50 No 0.45
P(Accident) 
0.0321X
No 0.05
P(Accident) 
0.025X
X Probability
No 0.50 P(Safe) 0.5X
Manual Operation
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Figure 3-5: Tank with Bypass Line and Three Manual Valves 
The event tree created above was updated with the additional bypass valve in Figure 3-6. 
With the calculated probabilities of the updated event tree the resulting probability of an 
overflow accident was 0.0282 and for safe operation was 0.9718. One additional safety measure 
reduced the probability of an accident for this example by 51%.  
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Figure 3-6: Event Tree of Overflowing Tank with Bypass Line and Calculated Probabilities 
3.4.2. Proposed Bayesian Network Based on Event Tree  
The first Bayesian network was developed directly from the event tree of Figure 3-2. The 
risk of the system was also examined by creating a risk network. The Bayesian networks were 
created using GeNie 2.2 Academic, a software created by BayesFusion, LLC. For the first 
model, a total of 12 nodes were used. The breakdown of the node relationships and states are 
shown in Tables 3-1 and 3-2 respectively.  
The event tree of the tank with manual valves shown in Figure 3-2 was first directly 
translated into a Bayesian network as shown in Figure 3-7. The resulting probability of an 
accident for the same tank example was the same as the initial event tree.  
High Flow
Operator 
Notices High 
Flow and 
Reduces the 
Flow
Operator 
Opens Valve 
V-02
Operator 
Closes Valve 
V-01
Operator 
Opens Valve 
V-03
Result
Yes 0.85
P(Safe) 
0.4038X
Yes 0.95 Yes 0.55
P(Safe) 
0.0392X
No 0.15 Yes 0.90
P(Safe) 
0.0289X
No 0.45
Yes 0.50 No 0.10
P(Accident) 
0.0032X
No 0.05
P(Accident) 
0.025X
X Probability
No 0.50 Safe 0.5X
Manual Operation with Bypass
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Table 3-1: Bayesian Network Node Characterization and Relationships for the Tank with 
Manual Valves 
Node Node Name Parent Child Characterization 
1 Flow Conditions N/A Operator 
notices high 
flow and 
reduces flow 
Evidence 
2 Operator notices 
high flow and 
reduces flow 
Flow Conditions Valve 2 
Conditions 
Intermediate 
3 Valve 2 Conditions Operator notices high flow 
and reduces flow 
Valve 1 
Conditions 
Intermediate 
4 Valve 1 Conditions Valve 2 Conditions Operating 
Conditions 
Intermediate 
5 Operating 
Conditions 
Valve 1 Conditions Risk Intermediate 
6 Weather N/A Environmental 
impact 
Evidence 
7 Material type N/A Environmental 
impact 
Evidence 
8 Value of asset N/A Impact Evidence 
9 Population N/A Impact Evidence 
10 Environmental 
impact 
Weather/Material Type Impact Intermediate 
11 Impact Environmental impact/ 
Population/Value of asset 
Risk Intermediate 
12 Risk Impact N/A Query 
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Table 3-2: Bayesian Network Node States 
Node Node name States 
1 Flow Conditions High Flow; No High Flow 
2 Operator notices 
high flow and 
reduces flow 
Reduces High Flow; Does Not Reduce High Flow; No High 
Flow 
3 Valve 2 Conditions Open Valve 2; Does Not Open Valve 2; No High Flow; Does 
Not Reduce High Flow 
4 Valve 1 Conditions Open Valve 2; Close Valve 1; Does Not Close Valve 1; No 
High Flow; Does Not Reduce High Flow 
5 Operating 
Conditions 
Safe; Accident 
6 Weather Clear; Windy; Rainy; Stormy 
7 Material type Normal; Flammable; Toxic; Corrosive 
8 Value of asset High; Moderate; Low 
9 Population High; Moderate; Low 
10 Environmental 
impact 
Severe; Moderate; Low 
11 Impact Severe; Moderate; Low 
12 Risk High; Moderate; Low 
 
 
Figure 3-7: Bayesian Network of the Tank with Two Manual Valves 
Once the operating condition probabilities were determined a risk matrix was developed. 
The risk matrix used for the tank case is shown in Figure 3-8. The environmental impact 
considers the type of material and the weather conditions. The types of materials include 
flammable, toxic, corrosive and normal. The term normal was used for materials that are not 
considered dangerous. The types of weather considered were clear, windy, rain and stormy. The 
term stormy was used to consider more extreme weather such as both rainy and windy weather. 
24 
 
The environmental impact, asset cost and the population of the surrounding area were considered 
for the overall impact. The population and cost of the asset were divided into high, moderate and 
low. The impact was related to the final risk. For example, the environmental impact of 
flammable materials and windy weather was given a higher severity than normal material and 
any type of weather. This matrix was combined with the final operation condition of the tank to 
give the risk for any period of time.   
 
Figure 3-8: Risk and Impact Bayesian Network 
The risk and impact network was combined with the operating condition network to 
create the overall risk for the tank operation. The combined networks are shown in Figure 3-9.   
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Figure 3-9: Operating and Risk Impact Networks Combined 
In Figure 3-9, the likelihood of an accident and the overall impact gave a high risk value 
of 3.30%. If the material is changed to flammable the high risk will increase to a value of 3.83%. 
If the material is changed to toxic and the population to high the risk will increase to 4.47%.  
3.4.3. Updated Bayesian Network Development  
To relax the linear nature of the event tree, the Bayesian network was updated to allow 
for either valve to be opened without having one of the valve actions fail. The updated Bayesian 
network for the two valve system is shown in Figure 3-10. Additional nodes were added to 
include conditions of the valves changing and if the valve action was effective enough to stop an 
overflow action.  The probability of an overflow accident for the tank is now 0.0508 or 5.08% 
and the probability for safe operation was reduced to 94.92%. The high risk probability was 
reduced to 2.94%.  
26 
 
 
Figure 3-10: Updated Bayesian Network of Two Valve Tank 
The two valve model of Figure 3-10 was updated to include the use of the bypass valve 
V-3 as shown in Figure 3-11.  The probability of an overflow accident for the tank with bypass 
was 0.0348 or 3.48% and the probability of safe operation was 96.52%. The high risk probability 
was again reduced to a value of 2.01%. 
 
Figure 3-11: Bayesian Network for Tank with Bypass Valve 
The original tank example was under manual operation only. To further improve safety 
and reliability and automatic control loop was added in place of the manual valves. It is thought 
by many that by automating a process system it can be made safer (Haight & Caringi, 2007).  
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The manual valves were replaced with an automatic control valve on V-2 with a level indicator 
and transmitter on the tank as shown in Figure 3-12.  
 
Figure 3-12: Tank Example with a Level Control Loop on Valve V-2 
A new Bayesian network was created for the single automated control valve in Figure 3-
13. This new network included the conditions of the level indicator and transmitter and the flow 
controller. With just the automatic valve V-2 the probability of an accident actually increased to 
4.43% with the probability of safe operation decreasing to 95.57%.  This result was not 
unexpected. This is now only one route of failure instead of three routes of failure with the 
valves. The high risk probability increased to 2.56%. 
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Figure 3-13: Bayesian Network for Automated Valve with Level Control Loop 
To continue the trend of increasing the level of automation another control loop was 
added to the tank. A flow transmitter was added to the tank on the valve V-1 as shown in Figure 
3-14.  
 
Figure 3-14: Tank with Flow and Level Control Loops 
The Bayesian network of Figure 3-13 was updated and modified to include the new flow 
control loop on V-1 as shown in Figure 3-15. The addition of another control loop further 
increased the safety of the system to 98.77% and reduced the probability of accident to 1.23%. 
By adding control loops for a simple system and removing the manual operations, the operators 
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talents and skills may be applied elsewhere (Haight & Caringi, 2007). The high risk probability 
decreased to 0.713%. 
 
Figure 3-15: Bayesian Network for Two Control Loops 
To further continue the trend of automation, all valves were made into control valves as 
seen in Figure 3-16. A flow transmitter was added to the line after the bypass line and set to 
control the bypass valve V-3 in the event that one or both of the other valves or control loops 
failed.  
 
Figure 3-16: Tank with Two Flow Control Loops and Level Control Loop 
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Figure 3-17: Bayesian Network with Two Flow Control Loops and Level Control Loop 
The Bayesian network was modified again, Figure 3-17, to include the latest flow control 
loop and improve the tank system. The probability of an accident was reduced to 1.04% and the 
probability of safe operation was increased to 98.96%. The high risk probability was decreased 
further to 0.585%. The system is now completely automated. The system could be made even 
safer by implementing an additional safety system.  
The safety system proposed would be isolated from the main control loops and be there 
as a backup to operations. The safety system would have independent isolated sensors and 
controls signals on the valves in the event the control loops failed. The proposed safety system 
can be seen in Figure 2-18. The safety system transmitters and signals are highlighted in green.  
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Figure 3-18: Tank Diagram with Safety System 
The Bayesian network for the existing control loops was updated a final time to include 
the proposed safety system in Figure 3-18. The network is set up to include the condition that if 
the control systems as a whole or the existing control sensors fail the safety system would be 
activated in Figure 3-19. There are now six sensors, three for the original control system and 
three for the safety system. The safety system is responsible for the safe shutdown operation as a 
last resort to prevent an accident. With the safety system the probability of accident was reduced 
to 0.0105% and the probability of safe operation was increased to 99.9895%.  The high risk 
probability was decreased to a final value of 0.00118%. 
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Figure 3-19: Bayesian Network for the Control and Safety System 
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A summary of all of the accident and Risk of failure is shown in Table 3-3 with a 
calculation to show the percent reduction from the original manual system.  
Table 3-3: Summary of Accident and Risk of Failure for the Tank Systems 
 Accident 
Probability 
Change in 
Accident 
Probability 
Risk of Failure Change in the 
Risk 
Manual Valve 
System 
5.08% -- 2.94% -- 
Manual System 
with Bypass 
Valves 
3.48% -31.5% 2.01% -60.4% 
Level Control 
System 
4.43% -12.8% 2.56% -49.6% 
Control System 
with Two 
Controls 
1.23% -75.8% 0.713% -86.0% 
Control System 
with Three 
Controls 
1.02% -79.9% 0.588% -88.4% 
Three Controls 
with Additional 
Safety System 
0.0203% -99.6% 0.0118% -99.8% 
 
The values of the high risk were plotted over time using random data for the instances of 
high flow rates for the tank systems. Table 3-4 shows the random data for each of the tank 
systems. Figure 3-20 shows the high risk value multiplied by the instances of high flow for each 
minute of operation. A threshold value of 0.001 or 0.1% was selected to show the minimally 
acceptable risk level.  
The tank with the safety system is the only system to be below the threshold value based 
on the original Bayesian networks.  
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Table 3-4: High Risk Probabilities over Time for Each Tank System Using High Flow Data 
Minutes High flow 
readings in a 
minute taken 
each second 
High flow 
readings in 
one minute 
Manual 
Valves 
Manual 
Valves 
with 
Bypass 
Level 
Control 
System 
Level and 
Flow 
Control 
System 
Level and Two 
Flow Control 
Systems 
Level and 
Two Flow 
Control and 
Safety System 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 16 0.267 0.00784 0.00536 0.00683 0.00190 0.00157 3.15E-05 
2 16 0.267 0.00784 0.00536 0.00683 0.00190 0.00157 3.15E-05 
3 15 0.250 0.00735 0.00503 0.00640 0.00178 0.00147 2.95E-05 
4 15 0.250 0.00735 0.00503 0.00640 0.00178 0.00147 2.95E-05 
5 15 0.250 0.00735 0.00503 0.00640 0.00178 0.00147 2.95E-05 
6 15 0.250 0.00735 0.00503 0.00640 0.00178 0.00147 2.95E-05 
7 15 0.250 0.00735 0.00503 0.00640 0.00178 0.00147 2.95E-05 
8 15 0.250 0.00735 0.00503 0.00640 0.00178 0.00147 2.95E-05 
9 16 0.267 0.00784 0.00536 0.00683 0.00190 0.00157 3.15E-05 
10 16 0.267 0.00784 0.00536 0.00683 0.00190 0.00157 3.15E-05 
11 16 0.267 0.00784 0.00536 0.00683 0.00190 0.00157 3.15E-05 
12 16 0.267 0.00784 0.00536 0.00683 0.00190 0.00157 3.15E-05 
13 16 0.267 0.00784 0.00536 0.00683 0.00190 0.00157 3.15E-05 
14 16 0.267 0.00784 0.00536 0.00683 0.00190 0.00157 3.15E-05 
15 15 0.250 0.00735 0.00503 0.00640 0.00178 0.00147 2.95E-05 
16 15 0.250 0.00735 0.00503 0.00640 0.00178 0.00147 2.95E-05 
17 15 0.250 0.00735 0.00503 0.00640 0.00178 0.00147 2.95E-05 
18 15 0.250 0.00735 0.00503 0.00640 0.00178 0.00147 2.95E-05 
19 16 0.267 0.00784 0.00536 0.00683 0.00190 0.00157 3.15E-05 
20 15 0.250 0.00735 0.00503 0.00640 0.00178 0.00147 2.95E-05 
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Figure 3-20: High Risk Probabilities Plotted over 20 Minutes for Each Tank System 
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As an example of how the high risk probability changes with different physical 
conditions a sample case was used. For this tank, the risk matrix was changed to show the value 
of the asset as moderate, the population as low, the weather as clear and the material was 
changed from normal to flammable as shown in Figure 3-21. The results of the high risk change 
when the material was switched from normal to flammable in shown in Table 3-5.  
 
Figure 3-21: Risk Network with Evidence Selected for Case 
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Table 3-5: High Risk Probability of Tank Systems when Material is changed from Normal 
to Flammable 
 High Risk for Normal 
Material 
High Risk for Flammable 
Material 
Manual Valve System 1.13% 2.14% 
Manual System with Bypass 
Valves 
0.771% 1.47% 
Level Control System 0.981% 1.87% 
Control System with Two 
Controls 
0.273% 0.521% 
Control System with Three 
Controls 
0.225% 0.429% 
Three Controls with 
Additional Safety System 
0.00451% 0.00858% 
 
Using the same random data given in Table 3-4, Table 3-6 was created to show the 
probability of an accident for each of the tiers of protection with flammable material. In this 
scenario, the high risk values for the tanks with two control loops, three control loops and three 
control loops with a safety system were below the acceptable levels of risk until the weather was 
changed from clear to windy at 10 minutes. Only the safety system was below the acceptable 
risk. Since the value is so small, it will be very unlikely that the risk level will ever be above the 
threshold.  
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Table 3-6: High Risk Values for all Tank Designs with Normal Material changed to Flammable Material  
Minutes 
High flow 
readings in a 
minute taken 
each second 
High flow 
readings 
in one 
minute 
Manual 
Valves 
Manual 
Valves with 
Bypass 
Level 
Control 
System 
Level and 
Flow 
Control 
System 
Level and 
Two Flow 
Control 
Systems 
Level and 
Two Flow 
Control and 
Safety 
Systems 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 16 0.267 0.00301 0.00206 0.002616 0.000728 0.000600 1.20E-05 
2 16 0.267 0.00301 0.00206 0.002616 0.000728 0.000600 1.20E-05 
3 15 0.250 0.00283 0.00193 0.002453 0.000683 0.000563 1.13E-05 
4 15 0.250 0.00283 0.00193 0.002453 0.000683 0.000563 1.13E-05 
5 15 0.250 0.00283 0.00193 0.002453 0.000683 0.000563 1.13E-05 
6 15 0.250 0.00283 0.00193 0.002453 0.000683 0.000563 1.13E-05 
7 15 0.250 0.00283 0.00193 0.002453 0.000683 0.000563 1.13E-05 
8 15 0.250 0.00283 0.00193 0.002453 0.000683 0.000563 1.13E-05 
9 16 0.267 0.00301 0.00206 0.002616 0.000728 0.000600 1.20E-05 
10 16 0.267 0.00571 0.00392 0.00499 0.00139 0.00114 2.29E-05 
11 16 0.267 0.00571 0.00392 0.00499 0.00139 0.00114 2.29E-05 
12 16 0.267 0.00571 0.00392 0.00499 0.00139 0.00114 2.29E-05 
13 16 0.267 0.00571 0.00392 0.00499 0.00139 0.00114 2.29E-05 
14 16 0.267 0.00571 0.00392 0.00499 0.00139 0.00114 2.29E-05 
15 15 0.250 0.00535 0.00368 0.00468 0.00130 0.00107 2.15E-05 
16 15 0.250 0.00535 0.00368 0.00468 0.00130 0.00107 2.15E-05 
17 15 0.250 0.00535 0.00368 0.00468 0.00130 0.00107 2.15E-05 
18 15 0.250 0.00535 0.00368 0.00468 0.00130 0.00107 2.15E-05 
19 16 0.267 0.00571 0.00392 0.00499 0.00139 0.00114 2.29E-05 
20 15 0.250 0.00535 0.00368 0.00468 0.00130 0.00107 2.15E-05 
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Figure 3-22: High Risk Probability for all Tank Systems for Normal Material changed to Flammable Material 
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3.5. Conclusion  
The work outlined in this chapter proposes a dynamic risk monitoring system for process 
industries using a Bayesian network. By increasing the safety features, the overall risk to the 
process was reduced. This method allows for the risk of a process to be monitored in real time, 
and provides an opportunity for changes to be made to the process to minimize the risk. This 
method can be applied to other process systems to monitor risk in real time.  
  
41 
 
4. Chapter 4: Application of Risk Monitoring Methodology to the Williams 
Geismar Reboiler Rupture and Fire Accident 
4.1. Overview 
On June 13
th
, 2013 a reboiler on the propylene fractionator of the Williams Geismar 
Olefins Plant in Louisiana ruptured and caught fire. This accident killed two plant personal 
workers and injured 167 (CSB, Williams Geismar Olefins Plant Reboiler Rupture and Fire 
Geismar, Louisiana, 2016). The methodology presented in Chapter three was applied to this 
accident to demonstrate real world applications.  
Two safety and risk Bayesian networks were created for this case study. The first 
network created is based on the original design of the reboiler and propylene system. The second 
network created was based on an updated design using the recommendations by an investigative 
organization and the additional safety system demonstrated in Chapter three.  
The olefins plant operations and the accident are described in this chapter. 
4.2. Case Study Background 
Olefins, also known as alkenes, are a family of hydrocarbons that have one or more 
double carbon bonds. The Williams Geismar Olefins Plant produces propylene and ethylene 
from propane and ethane, respectively.  The process for producing ethylene and propylene is 
shown in Figure 4-1 as a process flow diagram.  
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Figure 4-1: Process Flow Diagram of the Williams Geismar Plant 
First, ethane and propane enter furnaces where they are converted or cracked into 
ethylene, propylene and by-products such as methane and butadiene. These gas products are first 
cooled by heat exchangers after leaving the furnaces. The gases are then further cooled in a 
quench tower. The cooled gases are then sent to different distillation columns for separation. The 
demethanizer column removes methane. The deethanizer removes the ethane and ethylene. The 
depropanizer removes propane and propylene. The remaining gases enter a debutanizer and are 
separated into butadiene and some other aromatic compounds such as toluene and benzene. The 
ethylene, propylene, butadiene and aromatic compounds are stored and transported. The ethane 
and ethylene of the deethanizer are sent to the ethylene fractionator which separates the ethane 
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and ethylene. The ethane is recycled back to the beginning of the process. The propane and 
propylene from the depropanizer are sent to a propylene fractionator which separates the propane 
and propylene. The propane, like the ethane, is recycled to the beginning of the process.  
In the quench tower, the gases are directly contacted with quench water which is sprayed 
down from the top. The quench water is heated by the gases and is used to provide heat in other 
areas of the plant. When the quench water is used for heating in areas of the plant it is cooled. 
The quench water is further cooled by a cooling system and then recycled back to the quench 
water tower in a closed system. Since the gas is in direct contact with the water, some gas 
products are condensed in the water as oily tar products (CSB, Williams Geismar Olefins Plant 
Reboiler Rupture and Fire Geismar, Louisiana, 2016). The oily products must be removed during 
a settling process before the water is used for heating. Unfortunately, some of the oily products 
are left in the quench water.   
Each of the distillations columns requires reboilers. The reboilers are shell and tube heat 
exchangers. The heat for the reboilers is supplied by the treated quench water. The process 
streams are heated in the shell and the quench water is cooled in the tubes of the reboilers. The 
oily products in the water are known to build-up on the insides of equipment including heat 
exchanger tubes. This build-up is known as fouling. Fouling of the tubes reduces the heat 
transfer potential and decreases flow rates. When the fouling is severe, maintenance is required 
to remove the oily build up. 
The schematic for the propylene fractionator prior to the accident is shown in Figure 4-2. 
Valves one and two on the tube side are ball valves. Valves three and four on the shell side are 
gate valves. There is a control valve on the quench water system. 
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Figure 4-2: Propylene Fractionator Schematic for Williams Geismar Plant 
The propylene fractionator had two reboilers, known as Reboiler A and Reboiler B. The 
reboiler that ruptures and caught on fire was reboiler B. The process fluid on the shell side 
contained a mixture of 95% propane with the balance propylene and four carbon hydrocarbons 
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such as butane.  This thesis with refer to the propane mixture as propane. The quench water 
entered the reboiler on the tube side to heat the propane on the shell side.  
Originally, both reboilers were operated continuously in series. When maintenance on 
one or both reboilers was required the system was shutdown. In 2001, the reboilers were 
reconfigured to operate in parallel so that one reboiler could operate when the other required 
maintenance.  After this reconfiguration, the reboilers had additional valves installed so that it 
could be isolated from the system. The pressure relief devices of the reboilers were located on 
the top of the fractionator column. When reboiler was isolated from the process it was also 
isolated from the pressure relief devices. Reboiler B was isolated for 16 months using block 
valves on both the tube and shell sides (CSB, Williams Geismar Olefins Plant Reboiler Rupture 
and Fire Geismar, Louisiana, 2016). The block valves were leaking propane into the shell over 
the duration of the isolation. This leakage was unknown to the plant operators at the time. When 
a plant employee opened the gate valve on the tube side hot water inlet a Boiling Liquid 
Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) occurred. The hot water heated the propane in the shell 
and caused the liquid to boil and caused the emerging vapor to expand resulting in an explosion.  
The reboiler shell ruptured due to the increase in pressure and lack of pressure relief. Upon 
release, the propane mixture caught fire and burned for three and a half hours. (Center for 
Chemical Process Safety, 2010) 
4.3. Methodology Application on Original Reboiler Design 
The methodology of chapter two was applied to a real world case study to show the 
applications. The accident scenario considered for this application is the overpressure of a 
reboiler. The basis for calculations is the flow of propane entering the shell.  
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The schematic for the propylene fractionator prior to the accident is shown in Figure 4-2 
was used to develop the Bayesian Network.  
An overpressure accident scenario for the reboilers would be caused by the following 
actions: overheating caused by the tube side, isolation from the pressure relief devices and 
accumulation in the shell (Guo, Khan, & Imtiaz, 2019). An increase of tube side fluid 
temperature would increase the temperature of the shell side process fluid and subsequently 
increase the pressure. The tube side fluid heat potential can increase when the flow is increased 
or the temperature of the fluid increases. If the reboiler is isolated from the pressure relief device, 
a pressure increase beyond the threshold of the equipment material will result in a rupture.  
A network based on the Olefins plant design prior to the accident is shown in Figure 4-3. 
The basis for the risk calculation is the flow rate of propane entering the reboiler. This network 
was not based on the templates of chapter three. In this network there are 21 nodes. Table 4-1 
shows the characterization and relationships of the nodes within the network. Table 4-2 shows 
the states of each of the nodes. This model involves the three main events, stated above, that 
would cause an overpressure accident of the reboiler.  
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Table 4-1: Bayesian Network Node Characterization and Relationships for the Original Reboiler Design 
Node Node Name Parent Child Characterization 
1 Propane Feed 
Conditions 
N/A Operator Notices Flow Condition Evidence 
2 Operator Notices 
Flow Condition 
Propane Feed Conditions Tube Side: Inlet Valve; Tube 
Side: Outlet Valve; Shell Side: 
Inlet Valve; Shell Side: Outlet 
Valve 
Intermediate 
3 Tube Side: Inlet 
Valve 
Operator Notices Flow Condition Overheating of Heat Exchanger Intermediate 
4 Tube Side: Outlet 
Valve 
Operator Notices Flow Condition Overheating of Heat Exchanger Intermediate 
5 Shell Side: Inlet 
Valve 
Operator Notices Flow Condition Accumulation in Shell; Isolated 
from PSV? 
Intermediate 
6 Shell Side: Outlet 
Valve 
Operator Notices Flow Condition Accumulation in Shell; Isolated 
from PSV? 
Intermediate 
7 Isolated from PSV? Shell Side: Inlet Valve; Shell Side: 
Outlet Valve 
Operating Condition  Intermediate 
8 Accumulation in 
Shell 
Shell Side: Inlet Valve; Shell Side: 
Outlet Valve 
Operating Condition Intermediate 
9 Flow Transmitter 
FT-QW Accuracy  
N/A Flow Control Signal to Valve CV-
QW 
Evidence 
10 Flow Control Signal 
to Valve CV-QW 
Flow Transmitter FT-QW 
Accuracy 
Action on Valve CV-QW Intermediate 
11 Action on Valve 
CV-QW 
Flow Control Signal to Valve CV-
QW 
Overheating of Heat Exchanger Intermediate 
12 Overheating of Heat 
Exchanger  
Change in Quench Water 
Temperature; Action on Valve CV-
QW 
Operating Condition Intermediate 
13 Change in Quench 
Water Temperature 
N/A Overheating of Heat Exchanger Evidence 
14 Operation Condition  Overheating of Heat Exchanger; Risk Intermediate 
48 
 
Node Node Name Parent Child Characterization 
Accumulation in Shell; Isolated 
from PSV? 
15 Weather N/A Environmental impact Evidence 
16 Material type N/A Environmental impact Evidence 
17 Value of asset N/A Impact Evidence 
18 Population N/A Impact Evidence 
19 Environmental 
impact 
Weather; Material type Impact Intermediate 
20 Impact Value of asset; Population; 
Environmental impact 
Risk Intermediate 
21 Risk Impact; Operation Condition N/A Query 
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Table 4-2: Bayesian Network Node States for the Original Design 
Node Node Name States 
1 Propane Feed Conditions High Flow; No High Flow; 
2 Operator Notices Flow Condition Operator Notices High Flow; Operator Does Not Notice High Flow; No High 
Flow 
3 Tube Side: Inlet Valve Tube Inlet Open; Tube Inlet Close; No High Flow 
4 Tube Side: Outlet Valve Tube Outlet Open; Tube Outlet Close; No High Flow 
5 Shell Side: Inlet Valve Shell Inlet Open; Shell Inlet Close; No High Flow 
6 Shell Side: Outlet Valve Shell Outlet Open; Shell Outlet Close; No High Flow 
7 Isolated from PSV? Yes Isolated; No Isolated; No High Flow 
8 Accumulation in Shell Yes Accumulation; No Accumulation; No High Flow 
9 Flow Transmitter FT-QW Accuracy FTQW Accurate; FTQW Inaccurate 
10 Flow Control Signal to Valve CV-QW Action Open CV-QW; Action Fail 
11 Action on Valve CV-QW CVQW Open; CVQW Not Open 
12 Overheating of Heat Exchanger QW Temperature Increase; QW Temperature Does Not Increase 
13 Change in Quench Water Temperature Yes Overheating; No Overheating; No High Flow 
14 Operation Condition Safe; Accident 
15 Weather Clear; Windy; Rainy; Stormy 
16 Material type Normal; Flammable; Toxic; Corrosive 
17 Value of asset High; Moderate; Low 
18 Population High; Moderate; Low 
19 Environmental impact Severe; Moderate; Low 
20 Impact Severe; Moderate; Low 
21 Risk High; Moderate; Low 
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Figure 4-3: Bayesian Network for Original Design of Geismar Plant 
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Based on the subjective values used in this network, the probability of an accident was 
5.60%. The probability of high risk, without any evidence selected, was 1.96%.  
The probability of high risk changed to 1.76% when the appropriate evidence was 
selected. It was assumed that the weather was clear, the population was low, the material type 
was flammable, and the cost of the asset was moderate.  
4.4. Methodology Application on Updated Safe Reboiler Design 
The original design of the reboiler systems was poor. The CSB made recommendations 
for the plant after their investigation was concluded. Most of the recommendations made were 
based on the management of the plant. One of the recommendations made was that a pressure 
relief device should be installed on the reboiler shell and not on another piece of equipment. This 
recommendation was not unexpected. National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors 
and National Board Inspection Code (NBIC) require that pressure relief devices are installed on 
all pressure vessels were the source of overpressure is internal to the vessel. At the time of the 
accident, Louisiana did not adopt this code (CSB, Williams Geismar Olefins Plant Reboiler 
Rupture and Fire Geismar, Louisiana, 2016).  
As part of the methodology of chapter three, the reboiler system was redesigned with 
safety controls.  Figure 4-4 shows the control systems of Heat Exchanger A. Since the reboilers 
are operated in parallel it was assumed that both reboilers would have the same separate control 
systems.  In this system, there are three control loops for the tube inlet valve. The tube inlet flow 
can be based on the temperature of the shell outlet in a feedback loop, the flow of the inlet itself 
in a feedback loop and the temperature and flow of the shell inlet in a feedforward loop. The 
flows of the shell outlet, shell inlet and tube outlet are controlled by flow controllers. The quench 
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water flow rate is controlled by the same flow control loop as before in Figure 4-4. A pressure 
relief device was installed on the shell of each reboiler.  
 
 
Figure 4-4: Schematic of Controls for Updated Reboiler Design 
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Similar to the final tank design of chapter three, an additional safety system was installed 
on the reboilers. For each control loops there are additional sensors and control signals separate 
from the operation in the case where a system shutdown is required. The control schematic for 
both heat exchangers is shown in Figure 4-5. 
 
Figure 4-5: Schematic of the Reboiler Design with Two Reboilers 
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Another network was developed based on the updated safety design of the reboilers 
including the safety system. Table 3-3 outlines the node characterization and the relationships. 
There are a total of 49 nodes. 
For each of the control loop transmitter nodes there are the following states: transmitter 
accurate, transmitter inaccurate, control system not operational and no high flow. For the safety 
control loop transmitters nodes there are the following states: transmitter accurate, transmitter 
inaccurate, control system not operational, control sensors operational and no high flow. For the 
control action nodes there are the following states: action success, action fail, control system not 
operation and no high flow. The safety control action nodes have the states: action success, 
action fail, control system operational, safety system not operational and no high flow. The 
nodes that are the same the original design network have the same states in this network. 
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Table 4-3: Bayesian Network Node Characterization and Relationships for Safe Design 
Node Node Name Parent Child Characterization 
1 Flow Conditions N/A Control system Condition; Safety System 
Operational 
Evidence 
2 Control system Condition Flow Conditions Safety System Operational; Flow 
Transmitter 0 Accuracy; Flow Transmitter 1 
Accuracy; Flow Transmitter 2 Accuracy; 
Flow Transmitter 3  Accuracy; Flow 
Transmitter 4 Accuracy; Temperature 
Transmitter 0 Accuracy; Temperature 
Transmitter 1 Accuracy 
Intermediate 
3 Flow Transmitter 0 
Accuracy (Tube Inlet) 
Control system Condition Flow Control 0 Signal Intermediate 
4 Flow Transmitter 1 
Accuracy (Tube Inlet) 
Control system Condition Flow Control 1 Signal Intermediate 
5 Flow Transmitter 2 
Accuracy (Tube Outlet) 
Control system Condition Flow Control 2 Signal Intermediate 
6 Flow Transmitter 3 
Accuracy  (Shell Outlet) 
Control system Condition Flow Control 3 Signal Intermediate 
7 Flow Transmitter 4 
Accuracy (Shell Inlet) 
Control system Condition Flow Control 4 Signal Intermediate 
8 Temperature Transmitter 
0 Accuracy (Tube Inlet) 
Control system Condition Temperature Control Signal 0 Intermediate 
9 Temperature Transmitter 
1 Accuracy (Tube Inlet) 
Control system Condition Temperature Control Signal 1 Intermediate 
10 Temperature Control 
Signal 0 (Tube Inlet) 
Temperature Transmitter 0 
Accuracy 
Control Action Effectiveness (Tube Side) Intermediate 
11 Temperature Control 
Signal 1 (Tube Inlet) 
Temperature Transmitter 1 
Accuracy 
Control Action Effectiveness (Tube Side) Intermediate 
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Node Node Name Parent Child Characterization 
12 Flow Control 0 Signal 
(Tube Inlet) 
Flow Transmitter 0 Accuracy Control Action Effectiveness (Tube Side) Intermediate 
13 Flow Control 1 Signal 
(Tube Inlet) 
Flow Transmitter 1 Accuracy Control Action Effectiveness (Tube Side) Intermediate 
14 Flow Control 2 Signal 
(Tube Outlet) 
Flow Transmitter 2 Accuracy Control Action Effectiveness (Tube Side) Intermediate 
15 Flow Control 3 Signal 
(Shell Outlet) 
Flow Transmitter 3 Accuracy Control Action Effectiveness (Shell Side) Intermediate 
16 Flow Control 4 Signal 
(Shell Inlet) 
Flow Transmitter 4 Accuracy Control Action Effectiveness (Shell Side) Intermediate 
17 Control Action 
Effectiveness (Shell Side) 
Flow Control 3 Signal (Shell 
Outlet); Flow Control 4 
Signal (Shell Inlet); 
Accumulation in Shell Intermediate 
18 Control Action 
Effectiveness (Tube Side) 
Flow Control 0 Signal (Tube 
Inlet); Flow Control 1 Signal 
(Tube Inlet); Flow Control 2 
Signal (Tube Outlet); 
Temperature Control 0 Signal 
(Tube Inlet); Temperature 
Control 1 Signal (Tube Inlet) 
Overheating on Tube Side Intermediate 
19 Safety System Operational Control system Condition Safety Flow Transmitter 0 Accuracy; Safety 
Flow Transmitter 1 Accuracy; Safety Flow 
Transmitter 2 Accuracy; Safety Flow 
Transmitter 3 Accuracy; Safety Flow 
Transmitter 4 Accuracy; Safety 
Temperature Transmitter 0 Accuracy; 
Safety Temperature Transmitter 1 Accuracy 
Intermediate 
20 Safety Flow Transmitter 0 
Accuracy 
Safety System Operational Safety Flow Control 0 Signal Intermediate 
21 Safety Flow Transmitter 1 
Accuracy 
Safety System Operational Safety Flow Control 1 Signal Intermediate 
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Node Node Name Parent Child Characterization 
22 Safety Flow Transmitter 2 
Accuracy 
Safety System Operational Safety Flow Control 2 Signal Intermediate 
23 Safety Flow Transmitter 3 
Accuracy 
Safety System Operational Safety Flow Control 3 Signal Intermediate 
24 Safety Flow Transmitter 4 
Accuracy 
Safety System Operational Safety Flow Control 4 Signal Intermediate 
25 Safety Temperature 
Transmitter 0 Accuracy 
Safety System Operational Safety Temperature Control Signal 0 Intermediate 
26 Safety Temperature 
Transmitter 1 Accuracy 
Safety System Operational Safety Temperature Control Signal 1 Intermediate 
27 Safety Temperature 
Control Signal 0 
Safety System Operational Safety Action Effectiveness (Tube Side) Intermediate 
28 Safety Temperature 
Control Signal 1 
Safety System Operational Safety Action Effectiveness (Tube Side) Intermediate 
29 Safety Flow Control 0 
Signal 
Safety Flow Transmitter 0 
Accuracy 
Safety Action Effectiveness (Tube Side) Intermediate 
30 Safety Flow Control 1 
Signal 
Safety Flow Transmitter 1 
Accuracy 
Safety Action Effectiveness (Tube Side) Intermediate 
31 Safety Flow Control 2 
Signal 
Safety Flow Transmitter 2 
Accuracy 
Safety Action Effectiveness (Tube Side) Intermediate 
32 Safety Flow Control 3 
Signal 
Safety Flow Transmitter 3 
Accuracy 
Safety Action Effectiveness (Shell Side) Intermediate 
33 Safety Flow Control 4 
Signal 
Safety Flow Transmitter 4 
Accuracy 
Safety Action Effectiveness (Shell Side) Intermediate 
34 Safety Action 
Effectiveness (Tube Side) 
Safety Flow Control 0 Signal; 
Safety Flow Control 1 Signal; 
Safety Flow Control 2 Signal;  
Safety Temperature Control 0 
Signal; Safety Temperature 
Control 1 Signal 
Overheating on Tube Side Intermediate 
35 Safety Action 
Effectiveness (Shell Side) 
Safety Flow Control 3 Signal; 
Safety Flow Control 4 Signal; 
Accumulation in Shell Intermediate 
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Node Node Name Parent Child Characterization 
36 Flow Control Action on 
CV-QW 
FT-QW Accuracy Overheating on Tube Side Intermediate 
37 FT-QW Accuracy N/A Flow Control Action on CV-QW Evidence 
38 Quench Water 
Temperature Increase 
N/A Overheating on Tube Side Evidence 
39 Accumulation in Shell Safety Action Effectiveness 
(Shell Side); Control Action 
Effectiveness (Shell Side) 
Operating Condition Intermediate 
40 Overheating on Tube Side Safety Action Effectiveness 
(Tube Side); Control Action 
Effectiveness (Tube Side); 
Quench Water Temperature 
Increase; Flow Control 
Action on CV-QW 
Operating Condition Intermediate 
41 Is PSV Operational? N/A Operating Condition Evidence 
42 Operating Condition Accumulation in Shell; 
Overheating on Tube Side; Is 
PSV Operational? 
Risk Intermediate 
43 Weather N/A Environmental impact Evidence 
44 Material type N/A Environmental impact Evidence 
45 Value of asset N/A Impact Evidence 
46 Population N/A Impact Evidence 
47 Environmental impact Weather; Material type Impact Intermediate 
48 Impact Value of asset; Population; 
Environmental impact 
Risk Intermediate 
49 Risk Impact; Operation Condition N/A Query 
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Figure 4-6: Bayesian Network of the Updated Reboiler Design 
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The network for the safe design is shown in Figure 4-6. The probability of accident was 
decreased to 0.249% from 5.60% and the probability of high risk was decreased to 0.501% from 
1.96%. With the same evidence selected for the original design, the high risk probability was 
decreased 0.407% from 1.76%. The probability for an overpressure accident was decreased by 
95.6% and the high risk probability was decreased 76.9% by with these additional safety 
measures.  
4.5.  Risk of Reboiler Rupture Monitored Over Time 
The risk and flow rate of propane entering the shell was plotted over time in Figure 4-7. 
Table 4-4 shows the data used to plot the risk over time.  
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Table 4-4: Sample Data for Plotting Risk of Original and Updated Design over Time 
Minutes High flow readings 
in a minute taken 
each second 
High flow 
readings in one 
minute 
Reboiler Safety Re-
Design 
Original Reboiler 
Design of 2001 
1 3 0.0500 0.000204 0.000880 
2 3 0.0500 0.000204 0.000880 
3 3 0.0500 0.000204 0.000880 
4 3 0.0500 0.000204 0.000880 
5 4 0.0670 0.000271 0.00117 
6 4 0.0670 0.000271 0.00117 
7 4 0.0670 0.000271 0.00117 
8 4 0.0670 0.000271 0.00117 
9 6 0.100 0.000407 0.00176 
10 6 0.100 0.000407 0.00176 
11 6 0.100 0.000407 0.00176 
12 6 0.100 0.000407 0.00176 
13 6 0.100 0.000407 0.00176 
14 6 0.100 0.000407 0.00176 
15 5 0.0830 0.000339 0.00147 
16 5 0.0830 0.000339 0.00147 
17 5 0.0830 0.000339 0.00147 
18 5 0.0830 0.000339 0.00147 
19 5 0.0830 0.000339 0.00147 
20 5 0.0830 0.000339 0.00147 
21 5 0.0830 0.000339 0.00147 
22 5 0.0830 0.000339 0.00147 
23 5 0.0830 0.000339 0.00147 
24 5 0.0830 0.000339 0.00147 
25 4 0.0670 0.000271 0.00117 
26 4 0.0670 0.000271 0.00117 
27 4 0.0670 0.000271 0.00117 
28 4 0.0670 0.000271 0.00117 
29 4 0.0670 0.000271 0.00117 
30 4 0.0670 0.000271 0.00117 
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Figure 4-7: Plot of Risk over Time for both Original and Updated Reboiler Design
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As shown in Figure 4-7, the risk level for the reboiler with the new design is much less 
risky as it is below the threshold. Since there are two reboilers, the data for the second could be 
used with the same matrix and its different conditions. Both reboiler overpressure risks could be 
plotted on the same graph. 
4.6. Conclusion  
For the Williams Geismar plant, the design was highly risky. It required significant 
revision to be a safer design. Analyzing the accident using the proposed methodology it is 
observed that if a monitoring system had been put in place, an accident may not have occurred. 
This risk monitoring system only considered the event of an over pressured reboiler and does not 
consider other accident scenarios. Incorporating different accident scenarios into a single matric 
is part of further work.   
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5. Chapter 5: Conclusion and Future Work 
5.1.  Conclusions 
In conclusion, risk can be monitored in a process system over time. While event trees are 
commonly used in risk assessments, this thesis describes how event trees can be modified into 
Bayesian networks. Event trees are static and lack flexibility for accurately determining risk in a 
process system. Bayesian networks are beneficial for risk prediction as they are dynamic and can 
change in real time to more accurately reflect process operations. The risk values produced by 
these networks can be used with process data to monitor process risk in real time. A summary of 
each chapter is as follows.  
Chapter one introduces safety and risk monitoring in process systems. The research 
motivation, objectives and outline were described in this chapter.   
Chapter two describes a literature review completed on process safety and risk, 
monitoring and modelling. Different process accidents were described, as well as different 
accident modelling techniques. The risk assessment method that is becoming more popular in 
literature and industry was used in the development of the methodology in chapter three. The 
factors influence safety 
Chapter three proposes a methodology for developing a risk monitoring model using 
event tree and Bayesian networks. These networks can be used to monitor risk in real time. 
Bayesian network uses and applications were described.  A simple example of an overflowing 
tank is used as basis for the network model. The design of the tank was improved upon in six 
steps to show how the improvements in safety reduce the overall risk of the process. The risk of 
the overflowing tank was plotted over time. The Bayesian network is dynamic and is used to 
65 
 
show how changing conditions improve or worsen the risk. It was shown how the Bayesian 
network can improve the prediction of an accident over the event tree as independent factors that 
could lead to an accident could be captured. This methodology created a framework for future 
studies and the ability to apply it to cases as seen in chapter four.  
Chapter four applies the methodology developed in chapter three to a real work case. The 
reboiler rupture and fire at the Williams Geismar Olefins Plant was used a case study. The 
accident of an over pressured reboiler was used for the network. A network was created based on 
the original design of the reboilers. A second network was created after safety based design 
features were implemented on the original set up. The risk values of the original and updated 
networks were plotted over time. The conditional probabilities for the final operating conditions 
were the same for both the original and safe designs. By updating the design of the reboiler to 
include safety features and controls the accident probability was decreased by 96% and the high 
risk probability was decreased 76.9%. By plotting the risk overtime, future projections of risk for 
the plant can be predicted and action can be taken to prevent accidents before they could occur. 
5.2. Future Work 
The methodology presented in this thesis can be improved upon by considering 
multivariate parameters. The developed methodology also needs to be tested using experimental 
data. As the values used in the Bayesian networks are subjective, the accuracy of the networks 
can be improved upon by the use of credible objective data. The methodology presented here 
shows the creation of a network based on a single accident type. In the future, the networks may 
be updated to include multiple different hazards of a process instead of a single event. The 
methodology will need to be applied to more complex case studies and if possible through lab 
and field experiments to check its applicability and usefulness.  
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